**One WTC: Biography of the Building***Claims, Controversies, Additional Points of Interest*

**P. 10:** OWTC explores how the Port Authority governance structure made it difficult to achieve consistent direction on the project.

**P. 10:** The book also touches on how the authority got “pummeled” for not being “a good player,” as former director Christopher O. Ward said, even though it had “mortgaged its future to fill a financial gap that no other entity in this country could have ever been able to do. It wasn’t that the Port said, ‘We’re going to bail everybody out’... [rather, Governor] Pataki turned to the Port Authority and basically said, ‘You guys are going to do it.’”

**P. 49, 50:** Why One World Trade Center is no longer called the “Freedom Tower.”

**P. 53:** Why the post-9/11 condition of the perimeter slurry walls presented an immediate, potentially catastrophic threat to all of lower Manhattan.

**P. 26:** The book examines why the initial master plan proposals were roundly rejected by the public.

**P. 27:** OWTC also explains that while the pre-planning process was not conceived as a design competition, it became one.

**P. 36:** From the outset, the LMDC’s ability to make decisions about this most intensely scrutinized project was hampered by a lack of clarity from public officials about whether remembrance or rebuilding was a priority, and by competing institutional claims between multiple parties.

**P. 36:** OWTC looks at LMDC’s misguided notion that the results of the Innovative Design Study could be compiled into a single design.

**P. 12:** Silverstein was entitled, by law, to rebuild using the architects of his choice, namely, Skidmore, Owings & Merrill.

**P. 72, 272:** By 2008, it was widely understood but unacknowledged that the World Trade Center project was off the rails. How the Port Authority broke the construction logjam—and why it had no choice but to do so. (Notes 272)

**P. 43:** It also looks at why Libeskind’s master plan was ultimately dismantled.

**P. 44:** Pataki, frustrated that things were not moving ahead as quickly as he’d like, strong-armed an uneasy alliance between Childs and Libeskind.

**P. 44, 48:** How the difficult collaboration between Childs/Libeskind was eventually resolved.

**P. 37**: The NYPD letter regarding security was lost on August 31, 2004.

**P. 48**: The building’s design underwent a seismic reconfiguration when the New York Police Department insisted that the tower’s security standards were insufficient.

**P. 58, 62-63:** Seven WTC determined the quality and standards of every other building at the Trade Center

**P. 94:** The structural and construction constraints imposed by the PATH train tracks, and how they were overcome.

**P. 79:** The book discusses the challenges of tenant negotiations with Condé Nast and the less predictable concerns that shaped the media giant’s decision to move downtown.

**P. 83:** PANYNJ and Durst’s value engineering effort saw the elimination of the radome and changed the design of the podium on which the building sits.

**P. 69:** One WTC’s profile may appear minimal and unadorned, but it is not.

**P. 87:** Why Chicago ceded the title of the “nation’s tallest tower” to One WTC after hours of closed-door deliberations.

**P. 109:** The project’s atypical construction process was unavoidable, as multiple buildings that were controlled by multiple parties were stacked on top of each other.

**P. 178:** The genesis of the 9/11 Museum meant that architect Davis Brody Bond had to invert design formulas that shape more traditional museums.

**P. 166:** The families of 9/11 victims expressed anger over the placement of their loved ones’ names on the memorial.

**P. 170, 274**: The book looks at how Arad and Bloomberg solved the names’ placement controversy. *(Notes 170)*

**P. 206, 210, 239, 276:** Why, after a long battle, a small Christian church won the right to rebuild at the Trade Center, and how the site was configured to accommodate it. (Notes 276)

**P. 213, 276, 297:** Why the Ground Zero Cross is displayed at the 9/11 Museum, despite protests from atheists.

**P. 230, 231:** How 3 WTC forced the Port Authority’s decision-making process to become more transparent, and why they agreed to do so.

**P. 219-225** Ancient Asian building philosophies, rather than western conventions, shaped 4 WTC

**P. 30, 269**: A surprising assessment from the Rudin Center at NYU: The Port Authority and Silverstein Properties made a sound investment in the WTC redevelopment. (Notes 269)

**P. 10:** In 2014, Governors Cuomo and Christie asked for a complete overhaul of the Port Authority’s governance structure. Consequently, *One World Trade* also commemorates the last great project undertaken by the agency before its essential structure, established in 1921, is dismantled.